Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 4

Issue 2

Article 5

4-1-1987

Kierkegaard's View of Humor: Must Christians Always be Solemn?
C. Stephen Evans

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Evans, C. Stephen (1987) "Kierkegaard's View of Humor: Must Christians Always be Solemn?," Faith and
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 4 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19874220
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol4/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

KIERKEGAARD'S VIEW OF HUMOR:
MUST CHRISTIANS ALWAYS BE SOLEMN?
C. Stephen Evans

Many people view humor and a serious religious life as antithetical. This paper attempts
to elucidate Kierkegaard's view of humor, and thereby to explain his claims that humor
is essentially linked to a religious life, and that the capacity for humor resides in a deep
structure of human existence. A distinction is drawn between humor as a general element
in life, and a special sense of humor as a "boundary zone" of the religious life. The latter
kind of "humorist"' embodies a religious perspective which is not Christian, but is closely
related to Christianity. Humor itself is a fundamental aspect of Christian faith.

In his writings Kierkegaard offers us a theory of what humor is, and two interesting
theses about humor. To begin with the theses, S. K. argues first of all that there
is an essential connection between humor and human existence. The idea is that
humor is no ephemeral or accidental human characteristic but is grounded in
something deep within our nature or our condition. This idea that humor touches
something deep is one S. K. shares with many other theorists about humor.
The second thesis is more unusual, however, and consequently more controversial. Kierkegaard also wants to claim that there is an essential connection
between humor and the religious life. Quite contrary to the stereotype of the
religious life as dour and somber, completely opposed to the carefree wit of the
humorist, Kierkegaard holds that the highest and deepest kind of humor is rooted
in a life-view which is recognizably religious, and that all humor is at bottom
made possible by those very features of human life which make the religious
life possible.
Before examining these two theses in detail and seeing what can be said on
their behalf, we must first look at Kierkegaard's overall account of what humor
is. Before doing that, it will be helpful to take a look at theories of humor
generally.
Philosophical Theories of Humor
What is a philosophical theory of humor? Primarily it is an account of what
humor is in its essence. The aim is not so much to know what makes us laugh,
but why something makes us laugh. And though I just spoke of laughter, and
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certainly there is a close connection between humor and laughter, a theory of
humor is not identical with a theory of laughter. We find many things humorous
which do not actually cause us to laugh; conversely we laugh in many situations
where we see nothing humorous, at least at the time, the laugh of nervous
embarrassment being a good example.
By and large theories of humor fall into one of three types.' These are relief
theories, superiority theories, and incongruity theories. These three types are not
always mutually exclusive, but are capable of being combined with each other
in various ways.
Relief theories, which would include Freud and Spencer as notable examples,
generally focus on humor as a pleasurable experience, which consists in or is
causally related to a discharge of accumulated tension or energy. Freud, for
example, appeals to the fact that so much humor revolves around sex and aggression (often disguised), and theorizes that humor, especially in jokes, provides a
way of discharging sexual and aggressive instincts which society forces us to
repress.
Superiority theories are actually the oldest of the three and number among
their famous proponents Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes. The basic idea is that
humor is a pleasant experience of oneself as superior. When we laugh, according
to Hobbes, we express "a sudden glory arising from some conception of some
eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our
own formerly."2
Though Hobbes does say that the superiority we enjoy in humor is not always
over others, it still seems that this is the paradigm case. Some have even theorized
that laughter evolved from "the roar of triumph in an ancient jungle duel, "3 or
from the baring of one's teeth as a demonstration of physical prowess.'
The third major type of theory, made famous by Kant and Schopenhauer, is
the incongruity theory. This view, which is, as we shall see, very much like
Kierkegaard's, is that humor arises through some contrast between what we
would normally expect and the actual course of our experience. The incongruity
must be one that is experienced as pleasant of course. Still, humor is regarded
as rooted in something which goes against the normal patterns grounded in our
past experience.
Kierkegaard's Theory

Now what is Kierkegaard's theory? How is it different from and related to
these traditional types of theories? As I have already said, fundamentally S. K.'s
theory is an incongruity theory, with strong similarities to Kant and Schopenhauer.
However, Kierkegaard is also able to incorporate significant elements from the
relief and superiority theories.
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Gaining an understanding of Kierkegaard's view of humor is made more
difficult by the fact that S. K. does not really discuss humor for its own sake,
but rather to illuminate his theory of the stages or spheres of existence. I shall
take a look at the place of humor in the "stages on life's way" presently, but I
shall first try to extract Kierkegaard's general theory of humor.
Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus defines humor in terms of the
concept of the comical. A humorist is a person who has mastered the comical,
who "has the comical with himself."5 The comical in tum is defined in terms of
"contradiction." "The tragic and the comic are the same, insofar as both are
contradiction; but the tragic is the suffering contradiction, the comical the painless
contradiction. "6 Climacus follows this definition with a long footnote listing
examples of jokes and other humorous situations.
These jokes and situations make it very clear that by "contradiction" Climacus
really means "incongruity," certainly not logical or formal contradiction. A
caricature is said to be comical because of the "contradiction" between likeness
and unlikeness which it contains. In a similar way a person who answers a
rhetorical question is said to be comical, the contradiction being that he answers
a question for which no answer was expected. My favorite example of humor
from this footnote is the story of the German-Danish clergyman who believes
he: has said "The Word became flesh," because he has been fooled by the false
cognates, the German "Fleisch" and the Danish "Flaesk." What he actually has
said from the pulpit is "The Word became pork."
In all these examples there is a "contradiction" but what is contradicted is our
normal expectation as to what goes with what, and what follows what. The
patterns of our experience are disrupted and the result is experienced as incongruOliS. (Parenthetically, this use of the term "contradiction" as meaning "incongruity" should give pause to those who insist on thinking that when Climacus
and Kierkegaard call the incarnation a contradiction they must mean logical or
formal contradiction.)
Climacus realizes that not every incongruity is comical, however. A contradiction is comical, rather than tragic, only if it is experienced as pleasant. This is
not merely determined by the content of the contradiction, but also by the
relationship of the individual to the incongruity. The same event can be tragic
to one person and comic to another, and even tragic and comic successively to
the same person.
Climacus expresses this by saying that humor demands that one occupy a
"higher" or "superior" perspective. The individual who is "trapped" or "caught"
by a contradiction experiences it as tragic. To be amusing the contradiction must
be: one for which the individual knows a "way out." He must be able to distance
himself by viewing the whole business from a superior vantage point.
It is clear then that Kierkegaard's view of humor, as developed by his
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pseudonym Climacus (and here I see no significant differences between S. K.
and Climacus) is a version of the incongruity theory. However, there are significant elements of the other two theories as well in S. K.'s thought. The notion
of superiority is significant in relation to humor because it is the possession of
a superior position that enables an individual to experience an incongruity as
pleasant rather than painful. Also implicit in his view is the notion that humor
provides a relief from the vexations of life. Though S. K. would certainly reject
the mechanical "discharge of psychic energy" model which is present in Freud,
because he would not think that such mechanical concepts could aptly describe
a person's mental and spiritual life, he certainly recognizes the common sense
experience of relief which gives Freud's view its plausibility. The person who
sees something humorously has found "a way out." Temporarily, at least, he
has escaped the pain of life.
Humor and Human Existence

With Kierkegaard's basic understanding of humor in mind, we can now look
at the theses which I attributed to Kierkegaard at the beginning of this paper:
that humor is essentially linked to both existence and religiousness. First we
shall look at humor in the context of existence.
Many thinkers are inclined to agree with Kierkegaard that humor is closely
linked to something fundamental in human life. A person who had absolutely
no capacity to perceive anything as humorous would not be like someone with
no capacity for doing algebra or playing the violin. Those capacities seem accidental, and however unfortunate an individual who totally lacked them might
be, she could still be fully human. Someone with zero capacity for humor would
strike us as fundamentally different from us, so different as to make us wonder
whether the person might be an angel, a robot, or an extra-terrestrial, rather than
a human being.
I believe, therefore, that Kierkegaard's first thesis-that humor is essentially
connected to human existence-is more in need of illumination than defense.
What we want to know is why this connection holds, and S. K. does of course
have something to say which is helpful here.
The reason humor is basic to human life is simply that contradiction is basic
to human life. Several of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, including Climacus, Vigilius Haufniensis, and AntiClimacus, speak of human existence as a "synthesis"
of contrasting or opposing elements. The self is seen as an attempt to unify
temporality and eternity, body and soul, necessity and possibility, finitude and
infinitude. In existence, however, the synthesis always remains incomplete,
unfinished, and hence an incongruity between the opposing elements always
remains.
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All of us have ideals, plans, possibilities: goals towards which we strive. We
are partly defined by the futures we seek. All of us are, however, equally defined
by our pasts, particularly those necessities which we did not choose but are
fundamentally a part of us for better or worse. We did not choose our parents,
our sex, our early up-bringing. All of us are fundamentally engaged in a movement
from what we have been to what we would be. But for none of us is this
movement totally serene. No one is a stranger to the tension between reality and
ideal. Yet our identity is found in both reality and ideal, or to be more precise,
in the movement from one to the other.
If both the comic and the tragic are grounded in contradiction and if human
existence itself at its very heart is a "contradiction," then it is clear why the
capacity to sense the tragic and comical is basic to human life:
Existence itself ... is a striving, and is just as pathetic as comical;
pathetic, because the striving is infinite, or directed toward the infinite,
is infinitizing, which is the highest pathos; comical, because the striving
is a self-contradiction. 7
Two qualifications must be made at this point. First, saying that the capacity
for humor is explained by the contradictory structure of human life does not
imply that all humor must be rooted directly in the deepest structures of existence.
It is true that our deepest humor symbolizes and often directly expresses the gap
between the ideal and the actual which is basic to human life. But we also laugh
at all kinds of incongruities, trivial ones as well as meaningful ones, silly puns
and witty plays on words as well as themes which directly bear on our identity
as selves. One might say that the fact that human existence is fundamentally
contradictory guarantees that humans will have a sensitivity to the contradictory,
whenever it appears. This does not, however, imply that all humor must somehow
be deep and profound.
The second qualification is that it is the capacity for humor which the contradictory character of human existence gives the individual. The degree to which that
capacity can be realized depends upon several factors. One must recall that to
experience a contradiction as comical, one must experience it in a painless
manner, which requires a superior, somewhat removed perspective. One's ability
to gain such a perspective is partly a matter of how reflective a person is. Hence,
Climacus says that education or culture is a pre-requisite for at least some types
of humor. 8 The second factor which affects one's ability to take such a detached
perspective is a person's religious orientation. To explain this we must move to
Kierkegaard's second thesis.
Humor and Religiousness
One of the oldest stereotypes of the religious individual is that he is humorless,
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a person whose serious mind-set precludes levity. This stereotype is not limited
to popular films and books, but is held by philosophers as well, Nietzsche being
a good illustration. Recently, in a fine book about humor, John Morreall has
repeated the charge that religion, especially in the Judeo-Christian form, is
incompatible with humor. According to Morreall, from a Christian perspective
"everything we think, say, and do brings us closer to eternal happiness or to
eternal damnation."9 If Christians were to take this seriously and really try to
live in this light, "they would undoubtedly be more solemn in everything they
do. Activities for mere amusement would be suppressed or eliminated, and it is
hard to see how laughter might survive."10
Kierkegaard agrees with Morreall that the Christian life is a life of earnestness,
but he rejects the claim that this earnestness precludes humor. He claims rather
that humor is closely connected to a type of religious life, which is in tum closely
connected with Christianity though not identical with it. Thus humor is closely
linked with Christianity. In the Journals and Papers he tells us that "the humorous
is present throughout Christianity."" In another journal entry he says that Christianity is the most humorous view of life in world-history. 12
To understand Kierkegaard's claims here one must try to understand the place
of humor in his theory of the stages or spheres of existence. It is of course a
well-known thesis of Kierkegaard's that there are three stages or spheres of
existence. The aesthetic life is the natural or immediate kind of life in which
everyone begins, where one simply attempts to satisfy one's natural desires or
urges. The aesthete lives for the moment. The ethical life is the life in which
one grasps the significance of the eternal and by ethical resolve attempts to
transcend one's natural desires and create a unified life. The religious life is the
life in which one recognizes the impossibility of actualizing the eternal through
positive action and instead one attempts to grasp it through repentance and
suffering.
This simple or not-socsimple schema of the three stages of existence is complicated by the inclusion of irony and humor as boundary zones or spheres. Irony
constitutes the boundary between the aesthetic and the ethical while humor
constitutes the boundary between the ethical and the religious.
It is very difficult to understand just what it means to regard humor as such
a "boundary zone." I think the key to making sense of this is to make a distinction
between humor as a general element in life and humor as a zone or sphere of
existence in Kierkegaard's special sense. The former is an ordinary sense of
humor; the latter involves a technical sense. The humorist in the latter sense,
who occupies the boundary zone in Kierkegaard's schema, is someone who has
taken the humor which is a general element in life and made it the fundamental
ground of his distinctive way of life. Thus "humor" in the ordinary sense is
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related to but not identical with "humor" as a boundary zone of existence. Since
the two are related, what Kierkegaard says about "humor" as a boundary does
shed some light on humor generally.
Everyone who exists has, as we have already seen, a sensitivity for the comic,
just by virtue of existing. Everyone is able to see a contradiction here or there
and to smile and laugh at it. Not everyone, however, is able to see and face the
fundamental contradiction in her own existence-to smile and laugh over herself.
Many people can laugh only in the Hobbesian way, at the infirmities of others.
The humorist in Kierkegaard's special sense has learned to smile at the whole
of life, because she has learned to smile at herself. She can see the incongruity
between her ideals and her actions, the contrast between the eternal Jove she
was created for and the feeble temporal actions through which she attempts to
create and express that love.
It should now be plain why humor in this deep, profound sense is so close to
the religious life. The heart of the religious life is this very perception of the
pemlanent discrepancy between ideal and actuality. It is this which leads the
religious individual in Kierkegaard's sense to see suffering and repentance as
the highest human actions, as opposed to the victorious action of the ethicist.
(See especially the Postscript in this connection.)'3
Yet Kierkegaard does not simply identify humor with the religious life. In the
Postscript Climacus calls humor the confinium of the religious life, at least of
that natural religiousness called religiousness A. Why is this?
The answer lies in recalling that to perceive a contradiction as humorous one
must perceive it from a detached standpoint. The religious individual in the
Postscript, who is strenuously seeking to existentially realize the resignation,
suffering. and guilt which characterize the religious life, has no such perspective.
In fact, he comes close in some ways to Morreall's stereotype of the religious
individual as humorless. (Though ultimately Climacus claims he escapes this
charge. The religious individual does go to the Deer Park for his outing, and he
enjoys himself, but only after fearful anguish and reflection.)
In the Postscript humor becomes the "out" to which a person escapes when
he can no longer endure the fearful stress of the truly religious life. For the
humorist does have that "higher perspective." The humorist intellectually sees
what the religious individual sees. He has a knowledge of the great contradiction
which is the heart of the religious life. But the humorist is someone who rests
in "recollection." He believes, like Socrates and Plato, that the eternal is something that all humans possess already. The humorist can smile at the contradictions
in lik because he sees life itself as fundamentally a jest; the eternal bliss one is
seeking is in one's possession already. ''To exist is like walking down a road,"
but the remarkable thing about it from the humorist's perspective is that "the
goal lies behind."14
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One can see from this that humor itself embodies a religious perspective of
sorts, one different from yet very close to that which Climacus characterizes as
religiousness A. Both humor and religiousness A are characterized as belonging
to "immanence" and as resting in "recollection." The difference is that in religiousness A the individual attempts to existentially realize the eternal consciousness
which he "recollects;" the humorist sees such earnest striving as a jest and not
worth the trouble. For the humorist, however much one strives, we "all get
equally far."" All of us possess eternity already; nothing one does is of any
eternal significance.
So humor and religiousness are not identical. Yet something like humor remains
as an element in religiousness A. There is present in religiousness A "an obscurely
sensed possibility" that the existential problem of guilt which the individual
cannot himself overcome is in some way overcome. The eternal is in some way
a possession. 16 Such a sense that the eternal is secure and guilt has been resolved
is necessary to "prevent the individual from leaping aside to despair. "17 This
seems very close to the humorist's "way out." Humor and religiousness A appear
then as the two poles in what Climacus would term mankind's natural religiosity:
the pole of serene and contemplative reflection and the pole of feverish, anguished
action. Most actual religious lives will contain both elements and will to a degree
oscillate between them.
Humor and Christianity

We see then that Kierkegaard has a concept of "humor" as a sphere of existence
which embodies a clearly religious view of life, a view which stands in an
intimate relationship to what Climacus terms religiousness A. Religiousness A
is not, however, identical with Christianity, though it seems to be a transfigured
element in Christian faith. Why is it then that Kierkegaard specifically links
humor and Christianity?
Here the textual evidence is obscure indeed. The best clue is, I think, the
often repeated claim that humor embodies a knowledge of Christianity which
has not been existentially realized in life. 18 What lies behind this is surely the
idea that the humorist has gained a knowledge of the incarnation, that great
contradiction which Climacus terms the absolute paradox, and is somehow able
to smile about this. At least an apparent "higher perspective" must have been
discovered. This apparent "higher perspective," which in the case of the pure
humorist is illusory, can only be found in the Christian doctrines of grace and
forgiveness.
If there is a place for humor in Christianity, it must surely rest on these two
doctrines. Despite the fact that life is earnest for the Christian there is also a
place for the humorous smile and even for laughter. (Perhaps it is partly because
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of the fact that life is earnest; 1 think that the incongruities which strike us as
most deeply humorous usually relate to what we care deeply about.) That place
for humor is provided by the grace of God and the forgiveness which is offered
freely in Christ. It is this which makes it possible for the earnest individual to
smile at the contradiction between his life and the ideal he sees in Christ.
It is this doctrine, 1 believe, that S. K. 's humorist has acquired a knowledge
of In viewing this doctrine solely as a doctrine, however, the humorist inevitably
misunderstands it. For the Christian the grace of God and forgiveness in Christ
are found through faith, which is an existential passion with a concrete historical
object. His life then becomes a blend of jest and earnestness, a gift and a task.
The gift is given with the task and the task with the gift.
The humorist, however, mis-perceives this as a philosophical doctrine, an
eternal truth about the human condition. Forgiveness is not something to be
grasped in time, but an eternal possession. We are all forgiven eternally. Our
forgiveness must simply be "recollected," and we all do get equally far. The
task is depreciated and one is left with a sympathetic, jesting attitude toward life.
The Humorist Today

This all too brief account of Kierkegaard's theory of humor bristles with
problems and questions. 19 Nothing has been said, for example, of what Kierkegaard called demonic humor, which corresponds closely to what would today
be termed nihilistic humor. Kierkegaard views this type of humor as an attack
on the eternal meaning which gives existence its depth. Here the "way out" for
the laugher is not a positive leap to the eternal, but a negative leap from the
eternal-to nothingness. Surely a great deal of humor in the twentieth century
would fit this category. But such topics must be left for another essay.
It is worth asking in conclusion, however, whether Kierkegaard's analysis of
humor fits our contemporary experience of humor. Are there contemporaries
who fit Kierkegaard's description of the humorist? I believe there are. Woody
Allen and Garrison Keillor are the names which come to mind.
In his movies Allen has pictured better than anyone else 1 know the basic
incongruity of human life. Yet somehow the incongruities in Allen's films are
tempered. We find ourselves able to smile at life and at ourselves. We sense a
sympathetic, healing conviction that at bottom our lives mean something, a
conviction which sometimes wrestles with darker, more nihilistic overtones, but
is hardly ever totally extinguished.
A joke at the end of Annie Hall expresses this perfectly. A man is talking to
his therapist and says that his brother is crazy. "He thinks he's a chicken!" "Why
don't you tum him in?" replies the therapist. "1 would, but 1 need the eggs."
The character Allen plays in the movie then glosses the joke to make an
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analogy to human life in general: "I guess that's pretty much how I feel about
relationships. 1 feel they're totally irrational, crazy, and absurd, but 1 guess we
keep going through it because most of us need the eggs."
Certainly this sort of humor embodies no explicit religious perspective in any
conventional sense. But it seems to me to subtly express, precisely through its
sympathetic humor, a sense that we are all redeemed. We all get equally far; in
a sense we get nowhere. But we nevertheless have an "obscurely sensed possibility," as Climacus would put it, that it all comes right in the end.
Woody Allen, then, seems to be a humorist in Kierkegaard's special sense.
Such a humorist is, as Kierkegaard would say, far from being a Christian. Perhaps
he is even far from that natural religiousness Climacus terms religiousness A.
But such a humorist clearly perceives the existential incongruity which lies at
the heart of the religious struggle. And perhaps, as Climacus would say, his
sympathetic humor expresses a knowledge of the grace and forgiveness which
figure so strongly in both Judaism and Christianity.
Garrison Keillor is, if anything, an even better illustration of the Kierkegaardian
view of humor. Keillor nicely vindicates another of Kierkegaard's theses about
humor: humor is not only embedded in a type of religiousness A which includes
a knowledge of Christianity; it can also be a part of a life which is authenticaIly
Christian. Humor is the "incognito" of the genuinely religious person. Garrison
Keillor's monologues from "Lake Wobegon" exhibit the most profound theological themes of Christian faith. However, those themes are exhibited not as
doctrines, but as realized in the lives of the people of Lake Wobegon: guilt,
forgi veness, mercy, love-all are there. And much to our surprise when they
are thus exhibited, the result is humorous. It's not the humor of a Hobbes which
revels in one's own superiority, but the deep humor which binds one more closely
to one's own fellow human beings.
In a convocation talk at Luther Northwestern Seminary in 1983, Keillor says
explicitly that "a person who follows Christ will never lack for comedy." It's
not difficult to grasp his meaning here; someone who takes seriously Christ's
teachings about loving one's enemies or giving to the poor cannot help but see
her life as incongruous, if she has even a modest degree of honesty. But insofar
as she is following Christ the redeemer, the incongruity can be experienced as
humorous, for Christ is indeed "the way out." As Keillor himself says, "laughter
is a kind of forgiveness."
Perhaps it is appropriate to end with another joke from Annie Hall. Two ladies
are complaining at a resort in the Catskills. "The food is really terrible here,"
remarks one. The other replies, "Yeah, and such small portions." Someone who
has not cared for the content of my essay at least cannot complain about the
smallness of the portion!
St. Olaf College
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NOTES

1. The typology is borrowed from John Morreall's excellent book Taking Laughter Seriously (SUNY
Press: Albany, N. Y., 1983). Morreall discusses these as theories of laughter, however, while I
wish to restrict my discussion to humor.
2. Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature in his Works, ed. by W. Molesworth (Bohn: London, 1840),
vol. 4, ch. 9. Quoted in Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously.
3. Albert Rapp, The Origins of Wit and Humor (E. P. Dutton: New York, 1951), p. 21.
4. See Anthony Ludovici, The Secret of Laughter (Viking Press: New York, 1933).
5. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. p. 455; p. 436. This reference and others from the Postscript
will follow this format: First page number given is from Kierkegaard's Samlede Vrerker 1st ed.,
(Gyldendals: Copenhagen, 1901-1906), volume VII. Second number refers to the old translation of
Swenson and Lowrie (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1968).
6. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. p. 447, p. 459.

7. P. 72, p. 84.
8. Postscript, p. 437, p. 449. See also p. 149, p. 159.

9. Taking Laughter Seriously, p. 125.
10. [hid. pp. 125- 126.

11. S¢ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H.

Hong (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, Indiana, 1970), Vol. II, Entry 1682.
12. Ihid. Entry 1681.

13. Book lJ, Chapter IV, Section II, "Existential Pathos."
14. Postscript, p. 390-391, p. 402.
15. Postscript, p. 391, p. 403.
16. Postscript, p. 472, p. 481.
17. Postscript, p. 484, pp. 492-492.
18. Postscript, p. 231, p. 243.

19. I have said more about some of these things (and less about others) in chapter X of my book
Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus,
(Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: 1983).

